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Bunnell: Exempt Status of Proceeds from Conversions of the Homestead

NOTES
EXEMPT STATUS OF PROCEEDS FROM CONVERSIONS OF
THE HOMESTEAD
Since 1868 homestead exemption has been available to the citizens
of Florida through their constitution. Nearly a century has elapsed
since the adoption of the first homestead law. During that period
it has undergone various revisions, and has been the source of considerable litigation in the courts. The present law is embodied in
article X of the constitution. Section 1 of that article provides that
a homestead of 160 acres of rural land or one-half acre of urban
land and one thousand dollars worth of personal property is to be
exempt from execution and forced sale. There are specific exceptions
to this exemption2 but they will not be considered.
The subject of this note is the extent to which the exemption provided by article X extends to the following proceeds that the homesteader might acquire in connection with the homestead: insurance
payments, judgments awarded for injuries to the homestead, proceeds
from voluntary sales of homestead property, and surplus proceeds from
involuntary conversions. Florida law is relatively settled in three of
these areas, but in the area of involuntary conversions the probable result must necessarily be a matter of conjecture.
Article X, section 1, also provides that: "the real estate shall not
be alienable without the joint consent of husband and wife." This
provision raises another question as to the effect of the homestead
law on these proceeds. If it is established that certain of these proceeds are included within the real property exemption from execution
and garnishment, does it follow that the court would forbid the husband or wife to use the money without consent of the other for purposes unconnected with the homestead? This problem has never been
presented to a Florida court, but available precedents at least suggest
the probable outcome.

1.

See Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Ex-

emption, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 14 n.10 (1949).
2. "But no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or assessments, or for
the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said property, or for
the erection or repair of improvements on the real estate exempted, or for the
house, field or other labor performed on the same. The exemption herein provided
for in a city or town shall not extend to more improvements or buildings than the

residence and business house of the owner ..

"

FLA.

Coxr. art. X, §1.

[410]
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INSURANCE PROCEEDS

It was established in Kohn v. Coats3 that the Florida homestead
exemption from execution and forced sale is applicable to fire insurance proceeds received by the homesteader as a result of damage
to or the destruction of his homestead. In holding that the exemption
extended to the proceeds despite the absence of a statutory provision,
the court said: 4
"The reason for the rule is that the homestead was provided
for the benefit of the exemptor's family, and it may be insured to protect them from loss. The insurance is intended to
restore the property in case it is destroyed by fire; those contracting with the exemptor are on knowledge of this fact, and
to hold that creditors could seize the proceeds of the insurance
policy would give them an advantage they never contemplated [and] would deprive the insured of the means provided
to take the place of and restore his homestead."
This result is consistent with the American weight of authority
although there have been decisions to the contrary. 5 It would seem
safe to assume that the same decision would be reached in connection
with the proceeds of any other insurance indemnifying against loss
to the property, e.g. wind, rain, or hurricane insurance.
The Kohn v. Coats result is unquestionably in harmony with the
spirit and purpose of the homestead law.6 It has often been said
that the law is to be liberally construed. 7 On the other hand, it is
said with equal frequency that the homestead provisions are not to be
used as a means of defrauding creditors.8 Yet the opinion in the
Kohn case in no way requires the insured to reinvest the insurance
proceeds in his homestead; it merely assumes that the homesteader
3. 103 Fla. 264, 138 So. 760 (1931); see also West Florida Grocery Co. v.
Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917).
4. 103 Fla. 264, 266, 138 So. 760 (1931).
5. See 26 AM. JUR. Homestead §51 (1940); 40 C.J.S. Homestead §74 (1944).
6. "'The whole theory of the law with relation to homesteads is based upon
the idea that as a matter of public policy, for the promotion of the prosperity
of the state, and to render independent and above want each citizen of the government, it is proper he should have a home where his family may be sheltered,
and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and the demands of creditors,
who have given credit under such a law.'" Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 Fla. 391,
84 So. 190 (1920).
7. E.g., Bessemer Properties v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So. 2d 832 (1946); Hill
v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917); Pasco v. Harley, 72 Fla. 819, 75
So. 30 (1917).
8. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1954); Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533,
58 So. 718 (1912).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss3/6

2

UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
REVIEW
Bunnell:
Exempt Status OF
of Proceeds
fromLAW
Conversions
of the Homestead

will do so. In most instances the insured probably will apply the
money to the rebuilding or repair of the homestead, but if he
should choose to do otherwise there is nothing in the opinion to discourage him.
Also, there is nothing in Kohn which suggests that the homesteader's wife would have any basis for relief if the husband decided
to use the insurance proceeds for his own benefit instead of reinvesting
them in the property. The provisions of article X referring to unilateral alienation apply only to real estate; they do not affect the one
thousand dollar personalty exemption. The court might well hold
that the insurance proceeds take the place of the realty 9 and are
therefore subject to the joint alienability requirements. Such a rule,
however, would be difficult to enforce unless provisions were made
requiring that insurance proceeds, paid in connection with homestead
property, be deposited in a separate account to be withdrawn only
on the order of both husband and wife. A requirement of this type
might also ensure that the money would not be used in such a way as
to defraud creditors.
JUDGMENTS AWARDED FOR INJURIES TO THE HOMESTEAD

When the homesteader recovers damages for invasion of his home-

stead right or for any other injury to the land, the Florida courts
have ruled that the damages collected are within the homestead exemption. In Hill v. First National Bank ° the supreme court had to
decide whether a money judgment recovered by the homesteader for
unlawful invasion of his homestead rights was exempt as homestead
property within the purview of article X. The homesteader had recovered the judgment against the defendant bank, but the bank sought

to set-off against the judgment a debt owed to it by the plaintiffhomesteader. The court held the damage award immune from claims
of the bank, and said:1- "where injury has been sustained because

of an unlawful seizure and sale of exempt property, the amount recovered as compensation for such injury . . . would likewise be held

exempt." The court pointed out that if it allowed the bank to setoff the plaintiff's obligation to it against the judgment for invasion of
the homestead right, it would be consenting to the subjection of exempt property to the payment of the bank's demands by indirect
2
means although not allowed by direct means.
The Hill case is the only reported decision in Florida concerning
applicability of the homestead exemption to judgments. What was
9.

But see, Johnson v. Hall, 163 S.V. 399, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).

10. 79 Fla. 391, 84 So. 190 (1920).
11. Id. at 398, 84 So. at 192.
12.

Id. at 399, 84 So. at 192.
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said there, however, tends to indicate that the exemption would
apply to the proceeds of any judgment arising out of injury to the
homestead. Other states have extended the exemption to judgments
awarded for injuries to the homestead resulting from condemnation
of a right-of-way through the property by a railroad,13 a trespass,' 4 a
wrongful seizure and detention of the property, 15 and a fire.16
The result in Hill, like that in Kohn, is consistent with the policy
of the homestead laws, but nothing in the opinion in either case requires the homesteader to dispose of the judgment proceeds in conjunction with his wife, or in connection with the homestead property.
Again, it seems that some such requirement is necessary if the realization of the basic purpose of the homestead law is to be assured.
PROCEEDS FROM VOLUNTARY SALES OF THE HOMESTEAD

The exemption status of proceeds realized from a voluntary sale
of the homestead is a source of considerable conflict in the courts.

7

Not until January 1962 did the Florida supreme court have occasion
to rule on the issue. Two previous Florida cases' s contain language
relating to the question, but in each the language is obviously dicta.
Norman v. Cannon intimated that the proceeds of a voluntary sale
would be exempt from execution; 9 Olsen v. Simpson indicated that
the funds would become personalty and therefore be limited to the
personalty exemption of one thousand dollars.20 In a 4-3 decision
reflecting the general disagreement on the subject, the Florida court
in Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix-' ruled in
favor of applying the homestead exemption to the proceeds of a voluntary sale of the homestead.
In the very able majority and dissenting opinions of Justice Hobson
and Justice Drew respectively, the court reviewed the authority, both
pro and con, within Florida and without, for including the proceeds
of a voluntary sale within the homestead exemption. In holding that
the proceeds were exempt from garnishment and execution, Justice
Hobson acknowledged that he was following the minority view in
13. Kaiser v. Seaton, 62 Iowa 463, 17 N.W. 664 (1883).
14. La Master v. Dickson, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 473, 43 S.W. 911 (1897).
15. Nat'l Bank of Denison v. Kilgore, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 43 S.W. 565
(1897).
16. Mudge v. Laming, 68 Iowa 641, 27 N.W. 793 (1886).
17. See Annot., 1 A.L.R. 483 (1919).
18. Olsen v. Simpson, 39 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1949); Norman v. Cannon, 133 Fla.
710, 182 So. 903 (1938).
19. Norman v. Cannon, supra note 18.
20. Olsen v. Simpson, supra note 18.
21. 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1962).
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the United States. 22 Many of the cases cited by the majority to support its decision, as Justice Drew pointed out in his dissent, 23 were
decided in jurisdictions having homestead laws worded in such a way
as to be more consistent with that result than is our law. Justice
Drew makes the observation that2 4 "when the majority opinion is
carefully analyzed, it is clear and unmistakably judicial legislation."
This conclusion appears to be valid for there is nothing in the
wording of article X, section 1 indicating an intention that the
homestead exemption follow the proceeds from a sale of the property. Unlike statutes in other states, which recognize the right to
have the homestead exemption on one house carry over to a new
house purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the first house,
the Florida law is such that a determination of homestead status must
be made separately for each house as it is acquired. It is well settled
that a conveyance of the homestead in the manner provided by law
terminates the homestead,2 5 and in order that new property may constitute a homestead, the head of a family must actually reside thereon
with his family.26

The majority opinion cites to the Kohn and Hill cases in support of its decision. The opinion maintains that these cases reflect the
attitude of the court in construing the homestead law liberally. 27 It
is true that the cited cases do disclose a disposition toward liberal
interpretation of the law, but this should not be taken to mean that
the court is entitled to extend the homestead exemption to proceeds
that are clearly outside the scope of the present law. The Kohn and
Hill cases may be distinguished from this case since in them the homesteader still retained title to the property but here he has disposed
of it. The majority opinion relies strongly on the subjective intention
of the homesteader to use the proceeds to purchase a new home within a reasonable time.2 1 But as Justice Drew notes, the Florida courts
have consistently held that intention alone will not give real property homestead status.

29

In the instant case the defendant had aban-

doned the homestead as a home and as a bona fide place of residence.
This will clearly terminate its homestead status under the Florida
law.30 The defendant has but a mere intention to reinvest the funds
22.
23.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 213.

24. Id. at 208.
25.

Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953).

26. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So. 2d 448 (1943); Lanier
v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928); Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 823 (1882).
27. Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, 137 So. 2d 201, 204
(Fla. 1962).
28.

Id. at 212.

29. Id. at 209, citing Drucker v. Rosenstein, 19 Fla. 191 (1882).
30. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So. 2d 448 (1943); Lanier
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NOTES
in new homestead property, and this is not enough to create a new
homestead under the established interpretation of article X.
Even ignoring the probability that the decision in Orange Brevard
Plumbing & Heating is judicial legislation and is unsupported by the
constitution or the prior cases, it creates extremely difficult questions
of fact, and is a potential breeder of litigation. This is vividly illustrated in the dissent. 31 It is first pointed out that the applicability
and extent of the homestead exemption to the proceeds will be largely
a question of determing the subjective intent of the homestead owner.
The head of the family must show "by a preponderance of the evidence" that he has "an abiding good faith intention prior to and at
the time of the sale of the homestead to reinvest the proceeds thereof
in another homestead within a reasonable time."32 Only those proceeds that are intended to be invested in the purchase of a new homestead are to be entitled to the exemption, and any surplus over this
amount is to be treated as the general assets of the debtor and subject
to levy and execution. Justice Drew also suggests that some of the
33
questions left unanswered by the majority opinion are:
"How is the creditor to know what amount may be subject to
attachment or levy; how is he to know when it may be subject
to attachment and levy; how is the homestead owner to know
how long he has to reinvest the proceeds in another home; what
is to become of the rights of the creditor [and the wife and
minor children] if the homestead owner decided to abandon
his 'abiding good faith intention' and remove himself and the
proceeds to another state; is the seller to be the sole arbiter
of how much of the sale is to be exempt merely by a mental
process of determining how much of the proceeds of the sale
he will reinvest in another homestead . . what is the meaning
of the words 'the funds must not be comingled with other
monies of the vendor but must be kept separate and apart and
held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home'?"
These problems are very real, and the only obvious way to solve
them and to furnish home owners, creditors, attorneys and the courts
a more precise criteria in this area is through legislation regulating
the use of such proceeds and designating the terms under which they
will be exempt. Certainly it is not advisable to establish too rigid
requirements for exempting the proceeds of a voluntary sale, but
neither is it wise to leave the question of their exemption entirely
v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928).
31. Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, supra note 27, at
210.
32. Id. at 206.
33. Id. at 210.
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dependent upon the subjective intention of the homesteader. Suggested legislative solutions for this problem will be considered subsequently.
SURPLUS PROCEEDS FROM INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS

The term "surplus proceeds from an involuntary conversion," as
it is used here, contemplates those proceeds which go to the homestead owner as a result of the execution and sale of the property in
satisfaction of some claim against which the property is not exempt,
such as the foreclosure of a purchase-money mortgage. Although no
reported Florida case has dealt with the effect of the homestead exemption on surplus proceeds arising out of an involuntary converversion of the property, there is every reason to believe that Florida
would hold that the proceeds are within the exemption. This is
clearly the majority view in the United States 3 4 and the only sensible
result. Merely because one creditor is superior to the homestead exemption is no reason to elevate the claims of the others. 35 The holdings of the Florida supreme court in the Kohn and Hill cases, and
especially in Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating, indicating as they
do a very liberal attitude toward applying the homestead exemption
to proceeds arising out of transactions and occurrences affecting the
homestead, leave little doubt as to what the result would be should
this question be raised here. The only serious issues that might arise
in connection with such surplus proceeds are those suggested by
Justice Drew in regard to the proceeds from a voluntary sale. The
same legislative action that could be taken to solve those problems
would be equally applicable to the surplus proceeds from an involuntary conversion.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

In each of the areas considered involving funds acquired by the
homestead owner in connection with the homestead, it has been concluded that the Florida courts would apply the homestead exemption
from execution and garnishment. When insurance proceeds or judgments are involved, the court has said that the funds will be exempt
from execution and garnishment, but it makes no statements to indicate that they may be disposed of only through the joint agreement of
the husband and wife. When the proceeds of a voluntary sale of the
homestead are involved, the court has been more restrictive in its
approach by holding that the proceeds will be exempt only to the
34.

See 26 Am. JUR. Homestead §50

(1940);

40 C.J.S. Homestead §§73, 75

(1944).
35. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1310 n.176 (1950).
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extent that the former homestead owner intends, at the time of sale,
to reinvest the proceeds in a new homestead. The court says that he
has only a "reasonable time" to invest these funds in his new home,
and that he cannot commingle them with his other monies. Since
the Florida court has not been faced squarely with the question of
the applicability of the homestead exemption to the surplus proceeds
from an involuntary conversion, it is impossible to predict with complete certainty under what conditions and restrictions the court would
make the exemption applicable. However, it is quite probable that
the court would restrict the exemption in much the same way as
with proceeds from voluntary sale. It may be that the qualifications
for exemption expressed in Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating
would now be applied in both insurance and judgment proceeds
settings.
It has already been pointed out that Orange Brevard Plumbing &
Heating established a very vague and indefinite criteria for determining when, and to what extent, the proceeds arising out of dealings
with the homestead may be within the exemption. In other states
the legislatures have undertaken to provide statutory guidelines to
regulate the use and investment of proceeds derived from the voluntary sale or involuntary conversion of homesteads. Only a minority
of the states having homestead exemptions- have statutory provisions
covering treatment and disposition of the proceeds of a voluntary
sale.37 Only one of these states allows the exemption to follow the
proceeds for an unlimited period. 38 The others limit the exemption to
a short period of time, usually either six months or a year. 39 After
that period expires, the proceeds are subject to execution and levy
unless they have been reinvested in a new homestead.
The Florida legislature might be well advised to follow the example of the few jurisdictions that have provided statutory regulation concerning the exemption of the proceeds of voluntary sales and
involuntary conversions of homestead property. It may be advantageous for the legislature to go further than other states and make
such statutes applicable to insurance and judgment proceeds as well.
In addition to limiting the time within which exempt proceeds must
be reinvested, the legislature should make provision for keeping the
36. All states except Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island,
and the District of Columbia have homestead exemption from execution and
forced sale. See Haskins, supra note 35, at 1290.
37. Id. at 1310.
38. See Miss. CODE ANN. §329 (1942).
39. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. §1265 (Deering 1960) (6 months); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 52, §6 (Supp. 1961) (1 year); MINN. STAT. ANN. §510.07 (1947) (6 months);

NEB.

REV. STAT.

§§40-116 (1960) (6 months);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§28-1-2 (1953) (1

year).
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